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OPINION 
_____________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Advanced Disposal Services East, Inc. 
(“Advanced”) petitions for review of an order of the 
National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB” or “the 
Board”) which held that Advanced violated sections 
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act 
(“NLRA”), by “refus[ing] to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of [its] employees.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(5).  Before this Court, Advanced not only 
challenges the merits of the NLRB’s determination but 
also argues that the NLRB Regional Director who 
facilitated the contested election lacked the authority to 
do so.  Advanced claims that because Director Dennis 
Walsh was appointed at a time when the Board lacked a 
valid quorum, his actions were ultra vires.  See generally 
NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014).1  The 
                                                 
1 In Noel Canning, the Supreme Court held that the January 4, 
2012, recess appointments of NLRB Members Block, Griffin, 
and Flynn were invalid.  NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 
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NLRB cross-applies for enforcement of its order. 
 Precisely because the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Noel Canning was so “rare and remarkable,” Bryan J. 
Leitch, NLRB v. Noel Canning: The Separation-of-
Powers Dialogue Continues, 2014 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 
221, 259, the litigation it has spawned raises novel 
questions that have yet to be addressed by this Court.  
This case, in particular, requires us to consider several 
issues which, while not directly related to Noel Canning, 
arose only because the invalid recess appointments of 
several NLRB members created a situation in which the 
validity of hundreds of NLRB orders and other official 
actions were cast into doubt.  See, e.g., Ben James, Noel 
Canning Ruling Casts Doubt on Regional Directors, 
Law360 (June 27, 2014, 9:11 PM), 
http://www.law360.com/articles/552592/noel-canning-
ruling-casts-doubt-on-regional-directors. 
 Specifically, we will consider three questions.  
                                                                                                             
2550, 2573 (2014).  As a result, the Board was not properly 
constituted until August 12, 2013, when three new members 
were sworn in.  Accordingly, all NLRB decisions in the 
interim violated the quorum and three-member-composition 
requirements of 29 U.S.C. § 153(b).  See New Process Steel, 
L.P. v. NLRB, 560 U.S. 674, 687-88 (2010); NLRB v. New 
Vista Nursing & Rehab., 719 F.3d 203, 208-09 (3d Cir. 
2013), reh’g granted, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 15360 (3d Cir. 
Aug. 11, 2014). 
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First, did Advanced forfeit its right to challenge Director 
Walsh’s authority by not raising the issue prior to the 
representation election?  Second, did Advanced’s 
execution of a Stipulated Election Agreement constitute 
an accession to Director Walsh’s authority, preventing 
Advanced from now challenging that authority?  Third, if 
we conclude that Director Walsh originally lacked 
authority to oversee the election, were his and the 
Board’s attempts to ratify their unauthorized conduct 
sufficient? 
 After considering the arguments put forward by 
both sides, we conclude that Advanced did not lose the 
ability to challenge Director Walsh’s authority by failing 
to raise this issue during the representation proceeding, 
nor did the Stipulated Election Agreement constitute an 
implied accession to Director Walsh’s authority.  We also 
hold that Director Walsh and the Board both properly 
ratified their previously unauthorized actions. 
 We must next address the merits of Advanced’s 
Petition for Review.  In doing so, we ask whether 
substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination 
that certain allegedly disruptive conduct did not 
“destroy[] the laboratory conditions of the election” and 
“render[] a free expression of choice of representation 
impossible.”  Zeiglers Refuse Collectors, Inc. v. NLRB, 
639 F.2d 1000, 1011 (3d Cir. 1981).  Upon careful 
review of the record, we hold that substantial evidence 
supports the Board’s determination and the Hearing 
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Officer’s findings.  We will therefore deny the petition 
for review and will grant the NLRB’s cross-application 
for enforcement. 
I. Procedural History 
 On March 5, 2014, the Teamsters Local Union No. 
384 filed a representation petition with Director Walsh 
seeking to represent a unit of workers at three of 
Advanced’s facilities.  The proposed unit consisted of 
approximately 120 full-time and regular part-time 
drivers, helpers, and mechanics.  The Union and 
Advanced entered into a Stipulated Election Agreement 
on March 13, 2014.  On April 16 and 17, 2014, secret 
ballot elections were held at all three of Advanced’s 
facilities, with sixty voters supporting unionization and 
fifty-eight opposing it.2  Advanced challenged the 
election outcome and was granted a hearing on May 19, 
2014, before Hearing Officer Devin Grosh.  On July 3, 
2014, Grosh issued his report, recommending that 
Advanced’s objections be overruled.  On December 16, 
2014, a three-member panel of the NLRB affirmed 
Grosh’s report and overruled all of Advanced’s 
additional objections to Grosh’s report. 
 In order to preserve its right to appeal, Advanced 
refused to bargain with the now-certified bargaining unit.  
Am. Fed’n of Labor v. NLRB, 308 U.S. 401, 404 (1940); 
                                                 
2 There was also one contested ballot which was not counted. 
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United Fed’n of Coll. Teachers, Local 1460 v. Miller, 
479 F.2d 1074, 1075 (2d Cir. 1973) (“It has long been 
held that N.L.R.B. certification proceedings do not result 
in reviewable final orders.”).  Director Walsh thus filed a 
Complaint and Notice of Hearing on February 19, 2015, 
seeking to enforce the Union’s certification and force the 
company to bargain.  Ultimately, a three-member panel 
of the NLRB issued a Decision and Order on May 8, 
2015, concluding that Advanced had violated § 158(a)(5) 
by refusing “to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of [its] employees.”  29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(5).  Advanced filed a petition for review on May 
15, 2015, and the NLRB cross-applied, seeking 
enforcement of its order. 3 
II. Forfeiture 
 We must determine whether Advanced forfeited 
the right to challenge Director Walsh’s authority to 
conduct the election by failing to properly raise the issue 
before the Board.  The NLRB argues that if Advanced 
had timely raised this issue, it could have “correct[ed] the 
flaw before the election.”  The NLRB also cites 
precedent suggesting that belated challenges like this are 
                                                 
3 We have jurisdiction to review the Board’s Order under 29 
U.S.C. § 160(e), (f).  “The Board’s legal determinations are 
subject to plenary review, but we will uphold the Board’s 
interpretations of the Act if they are reasonable.”  MCPC Inc. 
v. N.L.R.B., 813 F.3d 475, 482 (3d Cir. 2016). 
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untimely and thus are forfeited on appeal. 
 We disagree with the Board’s conclusion that a 
belated attack on Director Walsh’s authority can be 
forfeited.  Even though this challenge was not properly 
preserved below,4 we hold that a challenge like this one, 
which goes to the authority of the Board to act, 
constitutes an “extraordinary circumstance” under 
§ 160(e) and can thus be raised for the first time on 
appeal.  See Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 497 
(D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d on other grounds 134 S. Ct. 2550 
(2014). 
 Turning to § 160(e),5 we recognize that “a court of 
appeals has no power, sua sponte, to find objectionable a 
portion of any NLRB order, if no objection was raised 
before the Board and failure to object was not excused by 
any ‘extraordinary circumstances.’”  Oldwick Materials, 
Inc. v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 339, 342 (3d Cir. 1984).  This is 
so because § 160(e) is a jurisdictional administrative 
exhaustion requirement designed to ensure that any issue 
                                                 
4 Even though Advanced raised this challenge before the 
Board, it was not raised prior to the election, as required by 
the Board. 
5 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) states in relevant part: “No objection that 
has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or 
agency, shall be considered by the court, unless the failure or 
neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of 
extraordinary circumstances.” 
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raised on appeal was first presented to the Board, absent 
“extraordinary circumstances.”  See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e); 
Oldwick Materials, 732 F.2d at 341 (“Application of 
section 10(e) is mandatory, not discretionary.  . . .  
[P]etitioner’s failure to object or to urge ‘extraordinary 
circumstances’ before both the Board and this court 
requires foreclosure of any judicial consideration of 
objections in the enforcement proceeding.”).  
Section 160(e)’s status as a jurisdictional limitation on 
our authority is nothing new.  As the Supreme Court held 
in Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v. NLRB, if an issue 
was not raised during the proceedings before the Board, 
“judicial review is barred by § 10(e) of the Act, 29 
U.S.C. § 160(e).”  456 U.S. 645, 665 (1982).  The Court 
then explained that failure to satisfy § 160(e) meant that 
“the Court of Appeals lack[ed] jurisdiction to review 
objections that were not urged before the Board.”  Id. at 
666 (emphasis added).  Because Advanced did not raise 
its objection to Director Walsh’s authority at the proper 
time, we must decide whether its challenge constitutes an 
“extraordinary circumstance” under § 160(e). 
 In making this determination, we are cognizant of 
competing authority on this issue.  In Noel Canning, the 
D.C. Circuit noted that “the objections before us 
concerning lack of a quorum raise questions that go to 
the very power of the Board to act and implicate 
fundamental separation of powers concerns.”  705 F.3d at 
497.  Thus, “they are governed by the ‘extraordinary 
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circumstances’ exception to the 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) 
requirement and therefore are properly before us for 
review.”  Id.  In other words, the D.C. Circuit held that a 
challenge which goes to the very power of the Board to 
act is by definition an extraordinary circumstance. 
 The D.C. Circuit has since re-affirmed this 
conclusion, holding in SSC Mystic Operating Co., LLC v. 
NLRB, 801 F.3d 302, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and UC 
Health v. NLRB, 803 F.3d 669, 672-73 (D.C. Cir. 2015), 
that challenges to a Regional Director’s authority also 
implicate the very power of the Board to act and thus 
constitute extraordinary circumstances.  As the D.C. 
Circuit made clear, “[b]ecause this challenge and the 
argument that Regional Directors may not conduct 
elections while the Board lacks a quorum are both 
premised on the Board’s lack of authority to act, we 
believe both are properly before us no matter when they 
were first raised.”  SSC Mystic, 801 F.3d at 308.  The 
factual similarities between Advanced’s claim and both 
SSC Mystic and UC Health further support our 
conclusion.  In both of the above cases, an employer 
challenged the ability of a Regional Director to conduct 
the election in question because, at the time of the 
election, the NLRB lacked a valid quorum as a result of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Noel Canning.  This was 
deemed a challenge that “directly involves the question 
of whether the Board’s lack of a quorum stripped the 
Regional Directors of power” and thus “can be raised on 
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review even when . . . not raised before the agency.”  UC 
Health, 803 F.3d at 672-73. 
 But the similarity does not stop there.  In SSC 
Mystic, the employer made one additional argument that 
had not been raised in UC Health.  First, the employer 
noted that even though the NLRB’s Regional Director 
was initially validly appointed, when the NLRB 
reorganized its regions in 2012, his jurisdiction expanded 
to cover additional territory.  This occurred at a time 
when the NLRB did not have a proper quorum.  Thus, 
“Mystic insists that because the Board had no quorum in 
2012, it could not validly appoint Kreisburg to his new 
post as the Regional Director of new Region 1.”  SSC 
Mystic, 801 F.3d at 308.  Again, rebuffing the NLRB’s 
suggestion that this argument was waived, the D.C. 
Circuit held that this challenge was “premised on the 
Board’s lack of authority to act” and was thus properly 
before the court “no matter when [it was] first raised.”  
Id. 
 In contrast to the cases just described, the Eighth 
Circuit in NLRB v. RELCO Locomotives, Inc. held that 
the validity of the Board’s composition is not an 
extraordinary circumstance under § 160(e).  734 F.3d 764 
(8th Cir. 2013).  Before parsing out the differences 
between RELCO and SSC Mystic, however, we note one 
similarity.  The Eighth Circuit agrees that § 160(e) 
constitutes an “explicit jurisdictional exhaustion 
requirement” and recognizes that absent satisfaction of 
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§ 160(e), courts are not permitted to entertain challenges 
not properly raised before the Board.  Id. at 798.  Beyond 
this point of agreement, however, the Eighth Circuit parts 
ways with the D.C. Circuit, concluding that a challenge 
to the Board’s quorum requirement is not an 
extraordinary circumstance as defined by prior Eighth 
Circuit precedent.  In particular, the court notes that its 
case law has “identified only two situations that qualify 
as ‘extraordinary circumstances’ under § 160(e).”  Id. at 
796.  First, if the Board’s decision is “nakedly void under 
the statute” and, second, if “a new development of fact or 
law occurs after the Board’s decision or was otherwise 
unavailable to the party at the original hearing.”  Id. 
 Applying this interpretation of “extraordinary 
circumstances,” the Eighth Circuit concluded that 
challenges to the composition of the NLRB fall into 
neither category.  In addition, the court explained that a 
“challenge to the legal composition of an agency” should 
be characterized as an “affirmative defense that can be 
waived if it is not timely raised.”  Id. at 797.  Thus, the 
court “decline[d] to disturb the Board’s decision on the 
basis of RELCO’s appointments clause challenge.”  Id. at 
798. 
 Having assessed both approaches, we consider the 
D.C. Circuit’s analysis more persuasive for two reasons.  
First, a challenge to § 153(b) goes to the authority of the 
Board to act; it is not a mere procedural technicality.  
This suggests that § 153(b) is more than just an 
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affirmative defense, as the Eighth Circuit determined.  
Indeed, it strains credulity to conclude that a situation in 
which the Board lacks a valid quorum yet still attempts to 
issue binding orders is not “extraordinary.”6 
                                                 
6 While not necessary to our holding in this case, we also 
believe that § 153(b)’s quorum requirement (the provision 
that was violated when Director Walsh was appointed) is a 
statutory limitation on the Board’s authority to act, and thus 
can be considered “jurisdictional” in the sense that a 
challenge brought under it cannot be forfeited by failure to 
raise it before the agency.  In light of the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Noel Canning, the unambiguous terms of § 153(b) 
were violated when the NLRB appointed Director Walsh 
without a quorum—the statute’s clarity on this point 
precludes any deference under Chevron v. U.S.A. v. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 
(1984).  We therefore take the late Justice Scalia’s words in 
City of Arlington to heart and “rigorously apply” the 
“statutory limits on agencies’ authority” that Congress has 
drawn.  City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863, 1874 
(2013).  In doing so, we note that any interpretation of 
§ 153(b) in which the NLRB can act without a valid quorum 
would not be “a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id.  
We, therefore, believe that a violation of § 153(b) would put 
any contingent agency action outside the scope of that 
agency’s authority; holding otherwise would be “leaving the 
fox in charge of the henhouse,” as the late Justice Scalia put 
it.  In other words, Congress has established “a clear line, 
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 Second, and relatedly, we note that as a policy 
matter “it would be passing strange for an ultra vires 
agency action to be . . . insulated from judicial review.”  
Teamsters Local Union No. 455 v. NLRB, 765 F.3d 1198, 
1201 (10th Cir. 2014).7  If we were to conclude, as the 
Eighth Circuit presumably would, that Advanced has 
forfeited its challenge, we would ultimately be 
overlooking and “insulating from review” the actions of 
an improperly constituted, quorum-less Board issuing 
ultra vires orders.  In other words, we would be 
foreclosing a challenge to the Board’s statutory authority 
because it was not raised before the Board—which does 
seem “passing strange.”  Id.; see also Bender v. 
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986) 
(explaining that “every federal appellate court has a 
special obligation to ‘satisfy itself not only of its own 
jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause 
under review,’ even though the parties are prepared to 
concede it” (quoting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237, 
244 (1934))).   
 We hold, therefore, that a challenge which goes to 
the composition of the NLRB, and thus implicates its 
authority to act, constitutes an “extraordinary 
circumstance” under § 160(e).  We are thus satisfied that 
                                                                                                             
[and] the agency cannot go beyond it.”  Id.  Any attempt to do 
so is ultra vires and outside the Board’s statutory jurisdiction. 
7 While the Tenth Circuit made this argument in a different 
context, we believe similar logic applies here.   
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we have jurisdiction to entertain Advanced’s challenge to 
the authority of Director Walsh and accordingly exercise 
our discretion to reach the question of whether the 
actions of the Board and Director Walsh are proper 
despite Director Walsh’s invalid appointment.  See 
Bullock v. Dressel, 435 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(“[W]e have the discretion to consider an issue that was 
waived where refusal to reach it would result in a 
miscarriage of justice or where the issue’s resolution is of 
public importance.  We have such a situation here.” 
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). 
III. Stipulated Election Agreement 
 The Board also claims that Advanced 
“affirmatively acceded to Walsh’s authority” by signing 
the Stipulated Election Agreement, which the Board 
describes as a binding contract.  The Agreement lays out 
the election-day procedure, stating when and where the 
election will be held, where and for how long notice of 
the election will be posted, and who is eligible to vote.  It 
also explains that the Regional Director “in his 
discretion” will decide (1) what language(s) will be used 
on the ballot and the notice of election, and (2) when and 
where to reschedule the election if it is postponed. 
 Even assuming that the Agreement binds both 
parties as the Board alleges, nothing in it constitutes 
“explicit acceptance of the agency’s authority to act.”  
UC Health, 803 F.3d at 673.  Despite its claims to the 
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contrary, the Board cannot point to any language in the 
Agreement stating that Advanced “affirmatively acceded 
to Walsh’s authority,” as there is none.  The only 
language in the Agreement referencing the Regional 
Director relates to his duty to supervise the election and 
his discretionary authority to decide procedural issues not 
otherwise spelled out in the Agreement.  Thus, as the 
D.C. Circuit also concluded in UC Health, Advanced 
“did not expressly give up [its challenge to the authority 
of the Regional Director] when it executed the 
[Stipulated Election] Agreement; it merely signed a form 
agreement providing that the Board’s regulations would 
govern the election.”  Id.; see also SSC Mystic, 801 F.3d 
at 308 (same).  Accordingly, we hold that by signing the 
Stipulated Election Agreement, Advanced “did not 
expressly abandon anything.”  UC Health, 803 F.3d at 
673. 
 We also reject the Board’s attempt to distinguish 
this case from UC Health and SSC Mystic.  The Board 
relies on the uncertainty surrounding the status of the 
Board’s authority, explaining that the D.C. Circuit 
specifically mentioned the fact that the quorum issue 
might have been obviated by the time of the election.  
We find this unpersuasive for two reasons.  First, based 
on the language in UC Health, which is cited in SSC 
Mystic, it appears that this was not a key factor in the 
court’s decision, but merely an additional reason for 
rejecting the Board’s claim.  See id. at 673.  Second, even 
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taking this argument at face value, there is no principled 
basis for distinguishing the two situations.  As the D.C. 
Circuit noted,  
Indeed, when UC Health entered the 
Stipulated Election Agreement, . . . UC 
Health could not have known with any 
certainty that the Board had no quorum even 
without Senate approval for the President’s 
appointments until the Supreme Court 
handed down its decision in Noel Canning 
fourteen months after the election.  We will 
not hold UC Health responsible for failing to 
see the future.  
Id.  In just the same way, when Advanced entered into 
the Agreement on March 13, 2014, it had no way of 
knowing how the Supreme Court would rule in Noel 
Canning on June 26, 2014.  Finally, we note that the only 
authority the Board relies on for the claim that a party “is 
estopped from attacking the propriety of an election to 
which it has expressly agreed” is its own, and that this 
authority itself is currently on review in the D.C. Circuit.  
See ManorCare of Kingston, PA LLC, 361 NLRB No. 17, 
2014 WL 3919913 (Aug. 11, 2014), petition for review 
filed, Nos. 14-1166 & 14-1200, (argued Oct. 23, 2015).8  
                                                 
8 We note that the same arguments regarding estoppel and 
accession, with citations to the Board’s opinion in 
ManorCare of Kingston, were made before the D.C. Circuit 
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We thus see no reason to defer to the Board’s position in 
Kingston. 
IV. Ratification  
 Having concluded that this belated challenge to 
Director Walsh’s authority is permissible, we turn to 
whether ratification by the Board and Director Walsh 
was sufficient to cure the quorum violation which 
stripped the Board, and by extension Director Walsh, of 
the authority to oversee the Union election.9  We 
conclude that both ratifications were sufficient. 
 On July 18, 2014, all five members of a properly 
constituted Board “confirm[ed], adopt[ed], and ratif[ied] 
nunc pro tunc all administrative, personnel, and 
procurement matters approved by the Board or taken by 
or on behalf of the Board from January 4, 2012, to 
August 5, 2013, inclusive.”  Next, “having considered the 
relevant supporting materials,” the Board, “[i]n a further 
abundance of caution,” chose to “expressly authorize[] 
                                                                                                             
in both UC Health and SSC Mystic.  We thus find the Board’s 
attempt to distinguish UC Health and SSC Mystic, while 
relying on the same arguments it presented before the D.C. 
Circuit in those cases, unavailing. 
9 The Board does not attempt to argue that Walsh had the 
authority to act at the time of the election.  Instead, the Board 
only claims that his later actions constituted a ratification or 
affirmation of his earlier conduct, thus curing what the Board 
seems to admit was a “defect in Walsh’s appointment.” 
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the . . . selection of Dennis Walsh as Regional Director 
for Region 4.”  This alleged ratification was followed 
closely by that of Director Walsh, who, on July 30, 2014, 
“affirm[ed] and ratif[ied] any and all actions taken by me 
or on my behalf during that period, including all 
personnel and administrative decisions . . . .”  Director 
Walsh, however, did not go on to specifically address any 
of the particular decisions he made when acting ultra 
vires. 
 We must, therefore, decide whether this “remedy 
adequately addressed the prejudice” to Advanced 
stemming from Walsh’s unauthorized conduct.  Federal 
Election Comm’n v. Legi-Tech, 75 F.3d 704, 708 (D.C. 
Cir. 1996).  If so, “dismissal is neither necessary nor 
appropriate.”  Id.  “[T]he general rule [is] that the 
ratification of an act purported to be done for a principal 
by an agent is treated as effective at the time the act was 
done.  In other words, . . . the ratification ‘relates back’ in 
time to the date of the act by the agent.”  In re E. Supply 
Co., 267 F.2d 776, 778 (3d Cir. 1959); see also 
Depenbrock v. CIGNA Corp., 389 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 
2004) (same). 
 Ratification of previously unauthorized agency 
action, however, presents a unique situation that has not 
been specifically dealt with by this Court.  Unlike most 
instances of ratification, here the same party is both the 
principal and the agent, simply acting at different points 
in time.  That fact alone distinguishes this case from most 
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other ratification cases, but does not mean that we cannot 
glean some insight into this situation from our prior 
precedent.  Indeed, we find that past precedent suggests 
there are three general requirements for ratification.  
First, the ratifier must, at the time of ratification, still 
have the authority to take the action to be ratified.  
Second, the ratifier must have full knowledge of the 
decision to be ratified.  Third, the ratifier must make a 
detached and considered affirmation of the earlier 
decision.  These last two requirements are intended to 
ensure that the ratifier does not blindly affirm the earlier 
decision without due consideration.  These requirements, 
of course, must also be adapted to the unique situation we 
are confronted with here. 
 We turn to the first requirement, the continuing 
authority to act.  In Federal Election Commission v. NRA 
Political Victory Fund, the Supreme Court had to 
determine whether belated authorization by the Solicitor 
General which would have permitted the Federal Election 
Commission to file a petition for certiorari “relates back 
to the date of the FEC’s unauthorized filing so as to make 
it timely.”  513 U.S. 88, 98 (1994).  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court held that ratification was not appropriate 
because the deadline by which the FEC could seek 
certiorari had passed, preventing ratification.  Or to put it 
another way, “it is essential that the party ratifying 
should be able not merely to do the act ratified at the time 
the act was done, but also at the time the ratification was 
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made.”  Id.  This “timing problem” has since been read to 
require that the ratifier have the “power” to reconsider 
the earlier decision at the time of ratification.  See Doolin 
Sec. Sav. Bank, F.S.B. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 139 
F.3d 203, 213-14 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Intercollegiate Broad. 
Sys., Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd., 796 F.3d 111, 117 
(D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 The second requirement is that the ratifier must 
have “knowledge of all the material facts” relating to the 
decision they are making.  Bauman v. Eschallier, 184 F. 
710, 711 (3d Cir. 1911) (“No one can be held to have 
ratified the unauthorized act of an agent, unless he has 
knowledge of all the material facts.”); Toebelman v. 
Missouri-Kansas Pipe Line Co., 130 F.2d 1016, 1022 (3d 
Cir. 1942) (“Ratification to be effective imports 
knowledge of all material facts on the part of those 
ratifying.”).  This requirement is intended to protect the 
ratifier from unknowingly ratifying conduct of which he 
or she was unaware.  Cf. Villanueva v. Brown, 103 F.3d 
1128, 1139 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Her act of signing the 
Investment Agreement clearly does not ratify an event 
which had not yet occurred.  She cannot ratify an action 
that she is not aware of.”). 
 Finally, the ratifier must make a “detached and 
considered judgment,” not simply rubberstamp the earlier 
action.  See Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213 (“We have no doubt 
that [the ratifier] made a detached and considered 
judgment in deciding the merits.”).  We also note, 
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however, that evidence of this requirement can either 
come from acts of “express ratification,” Standard Roller 
Bearing Co. v. Hess-Bright Mfg. Co., 275 F. 916, 921 (3d 
Cir. 1921), in which the ratifier “conduct[s] an 
independent evaluation of the merits,” Intercollegiate, 
796 F.3d at 117, or can be “implied from subsequent 
conduct,” Hess-Bright, 275 F. at 921, such as when a 
later act is “necessarily an affirmation of” an earlier act, 
Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213.   
 All that being said, we are quick to note that as an 
equitable remedy, ratification has been applied flexibly 
and has often been adapted to deal with unique and 
unusual circumstances.  We believe that Doolin provides 
a good example both of this adaptability and how 
ratification can apply in the context of administrative 
agency action.  In this case, the D.C. Circuit had to 
determine whether the actions of the properly appointed 
Director Retsinas ratified the earlier filing of a Notice of 
Charges against Doolin Bank by the improperly 
appointed Director Fiechter.  The court began its analysis 
by looking to NRA Political Victory Fund.  Id. at 212.  In 
so doing, it noted that no statute of limitations would 
prevent Retsinas from “starting the administrative 
proceedings over again.”  Id. at 213.  Thus, the court 
concluded that the “timing problem posed in NRA is not 
present here.”  Id. 
 The court then went on to examine the specific 
evidence of ratification.  It noted that while there was no 
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express ratification, Retsinas did not “simply writ[e] a 
letter or memorandum adopting” the actions of the earlier 
improperly appointed acting Director.  Id.  Instead, he 
continued forward “in the normal course of agency 
adjudication,” pursuing the claims Fiechter had initially 
made.  Id.  Retsinas thus ultimately issued a final written 
opinion and a cease and desist order against Doolin 
Bank.  This, the court noted, was “necessarily an 
affirmation of the validity of [Fiechter’s earlier conduct], 
and hence a ‘ratification,’ even though [Retsinas] did not 
formally invoke the term.”  Id.  The court thus concluded, 
“[w]e have no doubt Director Retsinas made a detached 
and considered judgment in deciding the merits against 
the Bank.”  Id. 
 Finally, we note one additional consideration that 
arises in the context of administrative agency ratification: 
the presumption of regularity.  This “doctrine thus allows 
courts to presume that what appears regular is regular, 
the burden shifting to the attacker to show the contrary.”  
Butler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001); 
Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 212 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“Agency action is entitled to a presumption of 
regularity, and it is the petitioner’s burden to show that 
the [agency] did not review the record when it considered 
the appeal.”).  This presumption ensures that we give 
proper deference and respect to the official actions of an 
agency.  Applying the presumption in our case, the 
burden is on Advanced to produce evidence that casts 
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doubt on the agency’s claim that the Board and Director 
Walsh properly ratified their earlier actions. 
 We thus turn to the two acts of ratification.  First, 
regarding the Board’s ratification, we begin by noting 
that Advanced has not pointed to, nor could we find, any 
statute or regulation that would prevent the Board from 
restarting the administrative actions in question at the 
time of ratification.  Thus, “the timing problem posed in 
NRA is not present here.”  Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213.  We 
also note that the Board easily satisfies the second and 
third ratification requirements.  The Board claims that it 
specifically considered the relevant supporting materials 
before reauthorizing the selection of Walsh as Regional 
Director.  The Board also states that it “confirm[ed], 
adopt[ed], and ratif[ied] nunc pro tunc” all its earlier 
actions.  Advanced does not present any evidence 
suggesting otherwise.  We can therefore presume that the 
Board had full knowledge of, and appropriately 
reconsidered, its earlier appointment of Director Walsh.  
We thus conclude that the Board properly ratified its 
selection of Director Walsh as a Regional Director. 
 We next look to Director Walsh’s ratification, 
which raises some additional concerns.  First, however, 
we note that both the first and second requirements for 
ratification are satisfied here.  There is no statutory or 
administrative limitation preventing Director Walsh from 
re-running the Union election at the time he ratified it; 
thus the NRA “timing issue” is not implicated here 
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either.10  Additionally, the knowledge requirement is 
easily satisfied: Director Walsh is both the principal and 
the agent.  Thus, at the time of ratification, he, better than 
anyone else, had full knowledge of his earlier actions. 
 The real question concerning Director Walsh’s 
ratification arises from the fact that we are confronted 
with a barebones, blanket affirmation, without any 
specific mention of this case or the details of any 
ratification process.  That being said, the evidence of 
ratification is stronger than it first appears.  Despite a 
mere blanket express ratification, Director Walsh also 
implicitly affirmed his conduct by filing a Complaint and 
Notice of Hearing on February 19, 2015.  The allegations 
in this filing, like in Doolin, were “necessarily an 
                                                 
10 Advanced points to § 88 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Agency, suggesting that by objecting to the authority of 
Director Walsh, ratification was no longer timely.  This 
argument attempts to shoehorn a mandatory agency 
adjudication into the narrow scope of § 88, which deals with 
“transactions” in which a party can “withdraw” his or her 
“offer or agreement.”  Unlike the situation that arises in a 
typical business or personal transaction in which a party can 
prevent ratification by terminating an offer before it is 
accepted, here Advanced could not simply withdraw its 
consent to the NLRB’s attempted bargaining and enforcement 
actions.  To put it another way, by objecting to the authority 
of Director Walsh, Advance did not “terminate” the 
“transaction” between the Board and Advanced; Advanced 
could not merely walk away at that point. 
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affirmation of the validity” of his earlier actions in 
conducting the election in April 2014, since they allege, 
among other things, that the Union is the proper and 
“exclusive collective bargaining representative” of 
Advanced’s covered employees. 
 Lastly, we note that Advanced has not made any 
claims which undermine the presumption of regularity 
here either.  Advanced only argues that Director Walsh’s 
ratification is a “rubberstamp,” and that the blanket 
ratification lacks evidence of independent consideration.  
But mere lack of detail in Director Walsh’s express 
ratification is not sufficient to overcome the presumption 
of regularity. 
 Advanced also attempts to distinguish Doolin by 
claiming that the court relied on the fact that “redoing the 
administrative proceedings would bring about the same 
outcome.”  Doolin, 139 F.3d at 214.  The court, 
according to Advanced, therefore employed a harmless 
error analysis, essentially concluding that even if 
ratification were imperfect, the outcome of the 
adjudication, if redone, would not change.  This, they 
argue, is not the case here.  A union election is a 
“dynamic and fluid situation,” in which the “whims of 
the electorate” are constantly changing.  Accordingly, 
Advanced argues that “there is no certainty in this case, 
as there was in Doolin.” 
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 While we are uncertain as to the extent to which 
the Doolin court actually relied on this harmless error 
analysis,11 we find Advanced’s attempt to distinguish 
Doolin unavailing.  Advanced is correct that in a close 
election, the whims of the electorate can easily change 
the ultimate outcome, but Director Walsh is not ratifying 
the conduct of every voter in the election; he is ratifying 
his own conduct in facilitating the election.  If we 
recognize this distinction, it becomes clear that what 
Advanced really wants is a second shot at convincing a 
sufficient number of voters to oppose unionization.  
Advanced does not argue that Director Walsh’s improper 
appointment in any way affected his own conduct and 
thus prejudiced Advanced.  Instead, Advanced asserts 
that voters might change their minds.  To put it bluntly, 
Advanced hopes that the “whims of the electorate” will 
favor it if the election is re-run.  This argument, 
therefore, does nothing to distinguish Doolin. 
 We accordingly hold that both the Board and 
Director Walsh properly ratified their earlier actions. 
                                                 
11 The court noted that unlike the harmless error analysis used 
in Legi-Tech, “[t]he situation here is somewhat different.”  
Doolin, 139 F.3d at 213.  Indeed, the court noted that “[w]e 
have no doubt that Director Retsinas made a detached and 
considered judgment.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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V. Election Day Conduct  
 We next address whether substantial evidence 
supported the Board’s decision to overrule Advanced’s 
objection and its refusal to grant a new election.  
Advanced points to several incidents on the morning of 
the election that it claims destroyed the “laboratory 
conditions” necessary to ensure a free and fair election.  
See General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 127 (1948).  
First, Advanced argues that the Board “inappropriately 
minimized” the “chaotic scene” at the company’s 
Norristown facility on the morning of the election.  In 
particular, Advanced points to an alleged confrontation 
between a Union representative and one of Advanced’s 
managers.  Second, Advanced highlights the conduct of 
one of its employees, Christopher Lyons, and argues that 
the Board “drew unreasonable inferences in finding that” 
Lyons’ actions were not threatening.  Each incident will 
be discussed in detail below. 
A. 
 As this Court has consistently held, we will accept 
the Board’s factual findings and the reasonable 
inferences derived from those findings if they are 
“supported by substantial evidence on the record 
considered as a whole.”  29 U.S.C. § 160(f); see 
Stardyne, Inc. v. NLRB, 41 F.3d 141, 151 (3d Cir. 1994).  
“Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla.  It means 
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept 
 29 
 
as adequate to support a conclusion.”  Tri-State Truck 
Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 616 F.2d 65, 69 (3d Cir. 1980) 
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  The 
substantiality of the evidence must also “take into 
account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its 
weight.”  Id. (quoting Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 
340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  We will also “defer to the Board’s credibility 
determinations,” and will reverse them “only if they are 
inherently incredible or patently unreasonable.”  Grane 
Health Care v. NLRB, 712 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 Because Advanced claims that allegedly disruptive 
election-day conduct necessitates a new election, the key 
question on appeal is whether the challenged conduct 
destroyed the “laboratory conditions” which this Court 
has held are “conducive to the sort of free and 
untrammeled choice of representatives contemplated by 
the [NLRA].”  Zeiglers, 639 F.2d at 1004-05.  In 
Zeiglers, however, we were also quick to note that “the 
goal of ‘laboratory conditions’ cannot always be 
satisfied.”  Id. at 1006.  Accordingly, we held that “[n]ot 
every election that fails to achieve perfection should be 
set aside.”  Id.  Instead, we noted that we would uphold 
“less-than-perfect” elections as long as “no coercive 
conduct has poisoned the fair and free choice which 
employees are entitled to make.”  Id. 
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B. 
 Advanced first alleges that on the morning of April 
17, 2014, Union Business Agent Chris O’Donnell 
engaged in conduct which interfered with employees’ 
exercise of free choice in the election.12  Advanced 
explains that O’Donnell parked an eighteen-wheeler at 
the bottom of Advanced’s driveway, creating a safety 
hazard since only one vehicle at a time could pass by.  
This made it difficult to see trucks entering or leaving the 
Advanced facility.  Advanced also alleges that when 
Manager Ed Smith approached O’Donnell and asked him 
to move the truck, he said he would only move his truck 
if Advanced moved the five garbage trucks it had 
positioned around the facility with “Vote No” signs on 
them.  Advanced then points out that the Union organizer 
threatened to “create havoc” by bringing in additional 
union demonstrators and starting a “brawl.”  Advanced 
further asserts that Union supporters “jumped out” and 
waved “Vote Yes” signs at workers as they drove by.  
This prompted Advanced’s managers to call the police, 
who arrived at the facility and told both parties to move 
                                                 
12 When evaluating conduct-based objections like this, the 
Board employs an objective standard to determine whether 
the conduct had a reasonable tendency to interfere with the 
employees’ exercise of their free choice.  This analysis looks 
to several factors including the number, severity, and 
proximity of the incident(s) to the election.  Trump Plaza 
Hotel & Casino, 352 NLRB 628, 629, 632 (2008). 
 31 
 
their vehicles.  Even though this resolved the immediate 
dispute, the police chose to remain on the scene. 
 The hearing officer, however, characterized this 
incident a bit differently.  First, he chose to credit the 
testimony of O’Donnell—who stated that Smith’s 
allegations were unfounded—because it “was more 
logical and plausible.  Second, the hearing officer pointed 
out that, according to the police report, Advanced’s 
garbage trucks also blocked part of the driveway, thus 
contributing to the safety hazard.  Third, the hearing 
officer noted that police presence alone is not 
objectionable at a Union election under prevailing 
precedent.  Nor was there any indication that the police 
even talked to anyone at the scene besides Advanced 
managers and the Union representatives.  Fourth, even 
assuming the facts were as Smith testified, the hearing 
officer noted that there was no indication the alleged 
threat was disseminated to any eligible voters—or to 
anyone else for that matter.  The hearing officer therefore 
concluded that O’Donnell’s conduct did not “interfere[] 
with employee’s exercise of free choice” in voting that 
morning. 
 We hold that substantial evidence in the record 
supports this conclusion.  Due to the minimal 
dissemination of the alleged, and discredited, threat, as 
well as the fact that the police report found both parties 
contributed to the “chaos” that morning, there is nothing 
to suggest that the Board inappropriately ignored or 
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minimized evidence of dissemination and failed to 
“properly consider the totality of the circumstances” 
surrounding the above incident, as Advanced argues. 
 The heart of Advanced’s complaint, however, 
relates to the conduct of Christopher Lyons.  Lyons was a 
driver at Advanced and a Union supporter.  He is also 
described as being approximately six feet tall, two 
hundred pounds, and “pretty built and stocky.”  
Regarding his conduct on the morning of the election, 
Advanced first notes that Smith testified to seeing Lyons 
“c[o]me flying” through the parking lot that morning, 
“tires squealing and everything.”  Smith then testified 
that Lyons and two other employees hung out for several 
hours that morning in the small room where employees 
clock in.  This was unusual behavior, since “nobody 
really congregates there.”  All three employees were also 
Union supporters and Advanced alleges that they 
intimidated several of the employees who went to clock 
in, noting testimony which stated that at least fifteen 
eligible voters clocked in during that period.  When 
another employee, Ben Shackleford, came to clock in, a 
heated discussion arose after Lyons found out that 
Shackleford intended to vote (or already had voted, it is 
unclear) against unionization.  This argument lasted no 
more than ten minutes and ended with Lyons dropping to 
his knees and pounding the wall in frustration.  Another 
Advanced employee later testified that the argument was 
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loud enough to be heard outside and that other Advanced 
employees could possibly have heard it. 
 Advanced argues that news of this incident spread 
quickly throughout the facility and created an atmosphere 
in which employees felt intimidated, undermining the 
possibility of a fair election.  Advanced also pointed to 
the fact that the vote was incredibly close: sixty to fifty-
eight, with one contested vote.  Thus, any employee who 
changed his or her vote from a ‘yes’ to a ‘no’ would have 
changed the outcome of the election.  Finally, Advanced 
challenges the hearing officer’s characterization of this 
incident, claiming that he went to great lengths to 
“discount the manager’s testimony” and downplay the 
Lyons/Shackleford argument as simply a “personal 
disagreement between two friends.”13 
 Looking first at the speeding incident in the 
parking lot, the hearing officer noted that the details of 
                                                 
13 The hearing officer also concluded that Lyons was not an 
official agent of the Union.  This is not challenged on appeal.  
Accordingly, the standard for third-party behavior is whether 
it was “so aggravated as to create a general atmosphere of 
fear and reprisal rendering a free election impossible.”  
Robert Orr-Sysco Food Servs., LLC, 338 NLRB 614, 615 
(2002); see also NLRB v. L & J Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 224, 239 
(3d Cir. 1984) (“We recognize that acts attributable to third 
parties are not subject to the same level of scrutiny as acts 
attributable to the union or employer.”). 
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Lyons’ driving into the parking lot were a bit murky.  No 
one questioned Lyons about his conduct that morning, he 
was not disciplined for it, and Smith (whose testimony 
alone referenced it) was not found to be credible by the 
hearing officer.  Additionally, Smith later admitted that 
he was not actually sure how fast Lyons was going (after 
earlier stating that it was about 50 m.p.h.), and instead 
said that he was going at least fast enough to make the 
tires squeal.  The hearing officer thus concluded that the 
speeding incident was “unlikely,” and even if it did 
occur, it did not create an atmosphere of fear and reprisal 
at the facility, in part because “there is no evidence that 
any employee witnessed or learned of this conduct during 
the critical period.”  We thus hold that these findings 
were supported by substantial evidence in the record, and 
that even if we credit the testimony of Smith, the conduct 
as he described it is simply insufficient to create an 
atmosphere of fear and reprisal that would influence an 
election. 
 Regarding the Lyons and Shackelford interaction, 
the hearing officer and the Board credited the testimony 
of the Advanced managers who witnessed the incident, 
finding that (1) Lyons and Shackleford got into a loud 
and heated argument over the Union election, (2) Lyons 
pounded the wall at least once in frustration, but (3) this 
and any other conversations were limited to the area 
around the room where employees clock in, which was as 
far from the polling place as possible in the facility. 
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 Even taking these facts in the light most favorable 
to Advanced, the hearing officer concluded that Lyons’ 
conduct did not create a “general atmosphere of fear and 
reprisal” necessary for finding that the election was no 
longer free.14  The hearing officer also concluded that the 
interaction, while loud, did not constitute a threat of 
physical violence toward Shackleford.  Further, the 
hearing officer noted that the wall was not damaged, 
Lyons had never gotten into a violent confrontation with 
another employee, Lyons was named employee of the 
month in August 2013, and the managers (who were only 
a few feet away) chose not to intervene.  Accordingly, 
the incident was deemed insufficient to warrant setting 
aside the election. 
 In reviewing the record on this issue, we also note 
that the arguments Advanced puts forward turn largely 
on questions of credibility and would require us to 
reevaluate the weight that should be afforded to different 
pieces of evidence.  We are cognizant of our precedent 
explaining that “we defer to the Board’s credibility 
determinations,” and will reverse them “only if they are 
inherently incredible or patently unreasonable.”  Grane 
Health Care, 712 F.3d at 149 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Quite simply, the credibility determinations 
made by the hearing officer and adopted by the Board are 
                                                 
14 The hearing officer also properly acknowledged that this 
conduct required additional scrutiny as the election was 
extremely close. 
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not inherently incredible.  Viewing the contested conduct 
in this light, we conclude that substantial evidence 
supported the Board’s decision. 
 We accordingly hold that the Board’s 
determinations regarding the challenged election-day 
conduct are supported by substantial evidence. 
VI. Conclusion 
 Our review of this case convinces us that the 
actions of the Board and Director Walsh were, 
ultimately, both procedurally and substantively valid.  
We will therefore deny Advanced’s petition for review 
and grant the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement 
of its order. 
